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COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY
COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY--WHY THEY
EXIST AND WHY THEY DIFFER
By "TAREN- B. KITTLE*
I
T has always been puzzling to the beginner and difficult for him
to understand how two apparent systems of law, differing
materially in their conceptions of human rights and in their
modes of procedure, should grow up at one and the same time in
the same country or state. The ordinary person is apt to think
that all law is based upon natural right, which all rational men
feel and acknowledge in a greater or less degree, and is the same
in all countries and in all courts, and they find it very hard to
understand why, in English jurisprudence, there are courts of
law and courts of equity, with a difference in the laws which they
administer. These differences may seem stranger still when we
remember that the courts of law and equity derived all their pow-
ers from the same source, and came into existence about the same
time. All power and authority exercised by the courts was de-
rived from the king. This was literally so in early times, and is
still true in theory.'
II
It is by reason of the different direction taken by the courts of
law in the course of time from the rule of right as administered
by the king in council and through his chancellor, that there grew
up a difference between the two courts. The common-law courts
ceased to expand after a certain period of development was
reached, and, refusing to recognize certain rights, of course had
no machinery with which to enforce such rights. And herein
lies the reason for the differences between courts of law and
courts of equity-the refusal of the law courts to expand-to
*Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit; author of THE LAW Or RULE DAYS
(1914), TE MODERN LAw Or ASsumpSIT (1917).
%See Lord Hobart in Martin v. Marshall & Key, Hobart 86 (ed. 1641); Idem.
154, 155 (Am. ed. 1829).
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recognize that society, institutions, peoples, all grow. Courts of
equity, on the other hand, developed the law as the state of so-
ciety developed, and as man became enlightened through study
and experience. Again, because of the lack of adequate process
for the enforcement of certain claims and rights newly developed
in society, courts of law, while not dening the right as an ab-
stract proposition, could give no relief, so that a multitude of new
rights began to be recognized and developed, for which there was
no remedy provided by the law courts. And simultaneously with
the development of these new rights, men began to devise new
wrongs, and new and ingenious defenses, with which the law
courts were unable, because of the narrowness of their rules, to
cope. Equity alone furnished a remedy.2
It was not a usurpation on the part of the court of chancery
for the purpose of acquiring and exercising power, but a bene-
ficial interposition to correct gross injustice, and to redress ag-
gravated and intolerable grievances that a remedy was devised
to meet new cases and new conditions.
III
In the modern and real sense English law and equity, begins
with the Norman kings. They found England without a com-
pact and stable government, without a general and universal sys-
tem of law for the whole country, but with a multitude of differ-
ent laws in the different shires or counties, derived from divers
sources, as certain customs of the primitive Britons, of the Picts,
Saxons and Danes, certain Roman laws, and those of Normandy,
and a multitude of special customs.2 Nor were there any national
courts. There were certain communal courts, county courts, courts
Baron and Manor courts, each exercising a precarious jurisdic-
tion.4 Says an eminent authority, "There was every element of
confusion and perplexity in the theory and administration of
the law itself, in the variety of the systems which were contending
for the mastery, and in the inefficiency of the courts in which they
were applied. English law had grown up out of Teutonic eus-
toms, into which Roman tradition had been slowly filtering
2See, EATON, EQUITY 8, 11-18.
31 BL. COm. 63 et seq.; 1 ODGERS, Com. LAW OF ENG. 49; BRUNNER, SOURCES OF
THE LAws OF ENGLAND.
'1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY ENG. LAW, Ch. 1; 1 SELECT ESSAYS ANGLO-AmR.
LEG. HIST. 113.
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through the Dark Ages. Feudal law still bore traces of its double
origin in the system of the Teutonic comitatus and in the Roman
beneficium. Forest law, which governed the vast extent of the
king's domain, was bound by neither Norman forms nor by Eng-
lish tradition, but was framed absolutely by the Idng's will. Canon
law had developed out of customs and precedents which had
served to regulate the first Christian communities, and which had
been largely formed out of the civil law of Rome. There was a
multitude of local customs which varied in every hundred and in
every fianor, and which were preserved by the jealously that pre-
vailed between one village and another, the strong sense of local
life and jurisdiction, and the strict adherence to immemorial
traditions.",
IV
It was the firm policy of the Norman kings to concentrate all
power within themselves, to overthrow the existing judicial sys-
tem, and this they proceeded to do in different ways as opportu-
nity afforded, with almost universal success. That the king can
do no wrong, and that be is the fountain of all justice, of all
dignity and honor, are familiar maxims to this day.' It is always
well to remember that the king, in early times. was the source of
all power and authority, both legislative, executive and judicial,
and the sovereign lord of all the land-he was the state. All his
subjects were under his rule, and had taken an oath of fealty to
him, "to bear faith and loyalty of life and limb, of body and
chattels and earthly honor."' 7 All lands were held mediately or
immediately of the king, and every tenant took a similar oath
of fealty to his lord or immediate land owner, and thus the whole
kingdom was bound together by a continuous line of oaths leading
from the most remote grantee up to the king.'
At first the legislative, executive and judicial functions were
not considered as separate and distinct departments of govern-
ment. These were of gradual development, and the king, at first,
exercised all three of these functions himself. It was left for
Montesquieu to discover and emphasize these elements of gov-
5Alice Stopford Green, "Centralization of Norman Justice under Henry II,"
1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 113.
61 BL. COm. 242, 246, 271.
71 POLL. & ILTL., HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2 ed., 299; 1 STUBBS, CONST.
HIT. 289, 366.
81 TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GROWTH ENG. CONST. 238-9.
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ernment in the English Constitution in 1748. 9 The numerous
charters, grants and concessions made by the different kings
show that they were considered as possessing all the rights and
the people few or none-that the people acquired all their rights
from the king. which, by continued pressure and exaction were
finally forced from him in the "great charter" and other docu.
ments acknowledging the "rights" of the people. This notion
prevailed especially among the early Norman kings. Says Stubbs,
"The king is accordingly both the chosen head of the nation-and
the lord paramount of the whole land; he is the source ol] justice
and the ultimate resource in appeal for such equity as he is
pleased to dispense; the supreme judge of his own necessities and
the methods taken to supply them. He is in fact despotic, for
there is no force that can constitutionally control him, or force
him to observe conditions to which, for his own security or for the
regular dispatch of business, he may have been pleased to pledge
himself. "
In taking possession of England the Norman conquerors re-
tained the Anglo-Saxon witan or council, which met upon sum-
mons, four times a year, but which did not receive the name of
"parliament" until the reign of Edward 1,11 and did not assume
to legislate independently of the king until the reign of the
Tudors. The Anglo-Saxon kings legislated by and with the advice
of the great council, and this was continued by the Norman kings.
Through feudalizing processes the national assembly gradually be-
came the king's court of feudal vassals whose right to exercise
power was made to depend practically upon the king's pleasure,
and while the powers of the council were practically reduced to a
mere shadow, the royal authority became the central and domi-
nant force in the constitution.
V
In order to discharge the vast and intricate duties which the
growth of the royal powers thus concentrated around the person
of the king, it became necessary for the crown to organize out of
the main body of the great council a smaUer body, or a special
council, composed of the king's immediate officers and advisors,
"See MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF TuE LAArs, Bk. 11, ch. 4.
101 STUBBS, C0NST. HIST., ch. 11, §118.
1I TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GRoWTH ENG. CONST. 239; 1 SPENCE, EQ. Jun. 328.
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which could be specially charged with the work of administration.
This select council consisted of the king's favorites and great of-
ficers, among whom were the chancellor, the treasurer, and the
grand justiciary.12 These bodies by which the king surrounded
himself did not legislate in any true sense, but only advised the
king, and the king made the laws with the advice of his council.
The statute was the king's act, and not the act of any parliament.
The reading of any British statute today will show this to have
been the rule.13
This select council became known as the curia regis, and in
modern times, corresponds very nearly to the privy council, al-
though their functions are now vastly different."4
The curia regis, which during the Norman period drew to itself
the whole center of administration and finance, has given birth
not only to every court of law or equity in which justice is ad-
ministered in the king's name, but also to the entire administra-
tive machinery of the constitution. " It may be regarded as the
parent stem from which the courts of law and equity have sprung.
Petitions were constantly addressed to the king in council for re-
lief in various matters, and this council exercised jurisdiction in
matters both civil and criminal. The old county courts and manor
courts were dominated by the great men of the kingdom, and the
poor were thus often denied redress in these courts. From such
oppression they appealed to the king in council by a petition,
called a bill, in which their grievances were set forth. This was
the origin of a bill in Parliament, and is retained in courts of
equity.0 After the great council or parliament became, in after
years, the supreme legislative authority of the kingdom, it still
retained many of its former judicial functions, and today the
highest court in the British Empire is the House of Lords. The
administration of justice continued nearly on the same footing
for eight reigns, extending over more than two centuries.1 7
As the business of the special council, or curia regis, increased
it became necessary to assign certain duties to certain persons or
Ul TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GROWTH ENG. CONST. 242: 1 SPENCE, EQ. JUR., 239.1
3MORRIS, MIST. Or THE DEVELOpMENT OF THE LAW 272-287; 1 STUBBS, CONST.
HIST. 400.
1I SPENCE, EQ. JuR. 239; 1 TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GROWTH or ENG. CONST. 232.
155 FREEMIAN, NORMAN CONQUEST 285.
361 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §48; DIGBY, HISTORY OF REAL PROPERTY,
5 ed., 321.
271 CAMPBELL, LIVEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 3.
5
Kittle: Courts of Law and Equity--Why They Exist and Why They Differ
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1919
WEST YIGINIA LAW QUABTERLY
a group of persons constituting the special council, and thus was
formulated the Exchequer, which is the oldest court, whose busi
ness originally pertained only to the revenue, but which, through
legal fictions, drew to it a civil jurisdistion; then there was estab-
lished the King's Bench, which was the highest court in the
kingdom, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, original and
appellate. Afterwards there was established the court of Common
Pleas for the trial of causes between subject and subject, which
was known as the common bench. Originally all these courts fol-
lowed the person of the king wherever he might be, and we find
one of the passages in Magna Carta providing that, "common
pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be holden in some certain
place."1 8 This provision led to the fixing of the common pleas at
Westminster, which broke up the unity of the curia. But it was
not until the end of the reign of Henry III that the general staff
permanently divided into three distinct courts, each exclusively
devoted to the hearing of a different class of causes.-the Ex-
chequer to the hearing of cases touching the king's revenue, the
Common Pleas to the hearing of private suits of subjects, and
the King's Bench to the hearing of all other suits that might fall
under the general head of placita coram rege.'9
VI
When the Norman kings first began to administer justice there
was no law common to all England. After the establishment of
the king's courts, the king's council and the courts began to for-
mulate certain rules which became common in all the courts, and
this was the germ of the common law. These rules were based on
certain ancient customs and laws which were modified to suit the
times. But the judges were at liberty to adopt any rule that
seemed just and right in the case before them, and had they been
men of greater statesmenship, of broader and rhore enlightened
views, the common law would have been far more perfect and ac-
ceptable than it turned out to be under the narrow course adopted
by the judges. The court of King's Bench and the court of Com-
mon Pleas, which consisted of several judges, were busy through
a course of years in formulating rules and adopting customs
ISMAGNA CARTA, Art. 17.
191 TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GROWTH O2p ENGLISH CONST. 249.
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which they termed the common law, and as most actions concerned
real estate in early times, these rules and customs followed the
feudal laws in all their strictness. From selfish motives the bar-
ons and great land owners clung to the harsh feudal laws and cus-
toms, which were advantageous to them, and of course influenced
their retainers and tenants to do likewise, and in this way the
common-law courts gained great favor with the ordinary citi-
zens, who were taught to believe that any variation from these
feudal laws was a violation of their ancient rights. That these
laws could be unjust, seems not to have been considered by them.
As decisions were made by the common-law courts, the judges
began to regard them as precedents, binding in future cases under
like circumstances, and thus the law began to harden and become
stereotyped, and to become written laws and a written system.
This was hurtful to a rightful and advantageous development. of
the common law. Thuis, as new facts arose and new situations
presented themselves it was often found that there was no rule of
law applicable to the state of facts presented, and the courts
would grant no relief. Then, at times, there was an element of
enmity between the king and the people, who began to chafe
under their Norman rulers, and as the judges, under the special
influence of the situation, sometimes sympathized with the people,
they held fast to the narrow rules of law which had grown up
under primitive conditions, and thus denied a remedy in the law
courts to the injury of the citizen, which should have been granted
when new and different circumstances arose. The common-law
courts relied too much on precedent. The law should have grown
as the wants of the people grew; but the fact is undeniable that
the law was always behind the growing wants of the people.
Many cases arose in which all men of sense admitted that there
should be a remedy provided, but which the narrow-minded
judges denied. It is true that the chancery issued all writs com-
mencing a suit in the common-law courts, (which is another evi-
dence of the origin of all the courts) which defined a remedy and
gave the court jurisdiction to try the cause, but the judges of the
common-law courts passed upon the legality of the writ, and re-
fused to entertain jurisdiction, if, in the opinion of the judges,
the law gave no remedy. This conduct effectually stunted and
crippled the growth of the common law. We have instances of
this narrowness for centuries, and a fair example, is the refusal
7
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of Lord Holt to admit the negotiability of promissory notes until
the Statute of Anne compelled him to do so. 20 Then again, the
remedies which the law courts gave were often wholly inadequate.
They were as bad as no remedy at all. The law courts knew no
remedies except to recover specific property in certain instances,
to recover a debt, which was considered in many ways as property,
and to recover damages measured in money. There were no
preventative remedies. The property had to be withheld, the debt
due, or the act committed causing damages, before the law would
take cognizance. They acted only after the fact.
VII
To remedy evident wrongs for which no relief was afforded by
the law courts, the aggrieved party petitioned the king in council,
who often granted relief in person, and who, as the business in-
creased, delegated these duties to certain of his council, and finally
to the chancellor, who acted with the council, and ultimately by
himself. As time went on the business of the chancellor grew and
increased and in the reign of Edward III the chancellor ceased
to follow the court as one of the royal retinue, and his tribunal
began to acquire a more distinct and substantative character.
Prom the twenty-second year of that reign, in which all petitions
of grace and favor were recognized as his province, his separate
and independent equitable jurisdiction began to grow in power
and importance. The equitable jurisdiction of the chancellor thus
became one of the three great agencies which have adapted the
old unelastic, code of customary law to the expanding wants of
progressing society, and for a long period of time the right of the
chancellor to act was not questioned.21
At first the chancellor entertained jurisdiction in all sorts of
cases, both civil and criminal, and whether for torts or for viola-
cion of contracts. 2 2 For instance, for many years the law courts
did not recognize any obligation arising from what we now term
a "simple contract," but these were enforced only in a court of
equity.2 3 Afterwards upon the development of the action of as-
M3 & 4 ANNE, C. 9; Brown v. Harraden, 4 T. R. 151; Clarke v. Martin, 2 Raym.
1. 777; Story v. Atkins, Id. 1430; Trier v. Bridgman, 2 East 350.
11 TAYLOR, ORIGIN & GROWTH OF THE ENG. CONST. 250; 1 HOLDSWORTH, HIST.
ENG. LAw 198; DIGBY, HIST. REAL PROP., 5 ed., 322.
-1 HOLDSWORIH, HIST. ENG. LAW 235; 1 SPENCE,. EQ. JUR. 685 et seq.
22 STREET, FOUNDATIONS Or LEGAL LIABILITY 35.
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sumpsit courts of law recognized these obligations, but this was:
in the fifteenth century. The reason for the assumption by the.
chancellor to act in all cases in early times was, that the law courts.
were dominated by persons who denied justice to the common
people, and often a suitor was expelled from the law courts by
threats and menaces during those turbulent times. Even the,
judges were not free from corrupt practices, and this occasioned
many prosecutions to be instituted against them.2 4 In fact, jus-
tice was not freely and evenly administered; hence an appeal to.
the king or his chancellor was necessary.25 After the law courts
began to administer justice more evenly, and without regard to
persons, the chancellor ceased to take cognizance of cases in which
the law courts afforded ample remedy.2" It was not, however,
until the law courts began to administer justice in a more fixed
and certain manner that the equity courts adopted the rule that
they would not take jurisdiction where there is a complete, ade-
quate and plain remedy at law.
VIII
But it still remained necessary for the court of chancery to.
afford relief in many instances simply because the law courts had.
narrowed the law and denied a remedy. T And here we must
observe that the chancellor acted vi'th the same power and au-
thority as the common-law judges, deriving his powers from the
king, the source of authority from which the common-law judges
derived their powers. It is strange that the common-law judges,
whose appointment and discharge depended wholly on the will of
the king, and who admitted the source of their authority was the
king, should ever deny the authority of the chancellor who derived
his powers from the same source, and whose office was as ancient
as that of any common-law court "-  In matters of law, the king
legislated, and by his authority delegated to the courts, the courta
legislated, not indeed, in the form of a statute, but in declaring
what was and what was not law; and this process, under the guise
2See 3 BL. Co. 408; 2 HOLDSWOnTH, -IsT. ENG. LAW ,183, 240 et seq.; 3.
FOSS, ME ORIES OF WESTMINSTER HALL 5.
51 SPENCE, EQ. JUR. 686-8; DIGRY, HIsT. REAL PRoPERTY, 5 ed., 325.
21 SPENCE, EQ. Jun. 689.
=See DIGRY, HIST. REAL PROPERTY, 5 ed., 32s.
See DIGaY, HIST. REAL PROPERTY, 5 ed., 321 et seq.; Msrtin -v. Marshall
Key, Hobart 63; 2 COx. DI.
9
Kittle: Courts of Law and Equity--Why They Exist and Why They Differ
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1919
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of judicial decisions, goes on to this day.2 . When the chancellor
declared a certain rule to be the law, he had as much authority
to do so as any common-law judge to declare a rule or custom to
be the law. The sources of their power were one and the same,
namely, the king. As stated, the powers of the court of chancery
and its right to act was not questioned until many years after the
Norman conquest. Indeed, this court was in great favor with the
people. It was not until there arose a conflict between the king
and his barons and other subjects that the powers exercised by
the chancellor were questioned, which usually resulted in an ap-
peal to the king and a decision in favor of the chancery. The
chancellor was usually an ecclesiastic, learned in the civil and
canon laws, and consequently borrowed many rules from these
sources, whieh he embodied in, and so enriched, the equity juris-
diction. There was also at times great enmity between the Eng-
lish nation and the Pope of Rome, because of certain tribute ex-
acted by the church, and this for a while caused a conflict between
the people, who for that reason hated everything Roman, and con-
sequently the chancellor.
The last of these controversies between the common-law courts
and the court of chancery was between Lord Coke and Chancellor
Ellsmere, in which Coke was ignominiously defeated.30 From this
time on the powers exercised by the chancellor have never been
seriously questioned. But Coke, while a great expounder of the
common law, was blinded and bigoted in his devotion to that law,
and did as much as lay in his power to retard its growth. He
regarded it as the perfection of human reason, and says, "if all
the reason that is dispersed into so many heads, were united into
one, yet he could not make such a law as the law of Efigland is.' '3
Every unbiased man knows this eulogy on the common law to be
nothing less than fulsome flattery. The ultimate adoption of
2gSALmOND, JURIsPRuDENCF, §50; HOLLAND, JRISpitUDENC'., 12 ed. 66, 77;
BLACKx, LAW OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 6. 7 ; 1 ODGERS, THE COMMON LAW OF
ENG. 88. In the Middle Ages legislation was not the primary business of parlia-
ment, and the rule that the king cannot legislate without parliament was established
only by decree. Early statutes, therefore, are of a mixed gharacter, containing
both legislative and ddministrative provisions. Law making, In the early period,
was not yet regarded as a distinct branch of sovereign power, external to the
judicial authorities. POLLOCK, FIRST l'0OK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 2 ed., 345-46.
-2 WHITE & TUDOR, LEADING CASES IN EQUITY, 4 Am. ed., 1298 ; 2 Id., (6 Eng. ed.),
652; 10 R. C. L. 257; 1 SPENCE, EQ. JuR. 673-75; 1 CAwPFrzL, LIVES Or rrHE
CHIEF JUSTICES, (Am. ed. 1873), 289; 2 CAMPBELL.. LES OF LOan CHANCELLORS,
(Am. ed. 1878), 338, 364, 386 et seq.
-ICOKE LIT. 97b, I THOMAS' COKE 1.
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equitable principles both by the law courts, and by legislation, has
been such, that there is very little of the common law left, as it
was in Coke's day, which shows that it never was "the perfection
of human reason," but the reverse.
Ix
Thus, side by side with the common law, there grew up a sys-
tem of equity law much more elastic, penetrating, and far better
adapted to the growing wants of the people than the unelastic
and unbending Conmmon law, and which was founded upon a far
higher ethical and moral plain, and more pregnant with sound
reason and common sense than many rules of the common law.32
The fact that such a system grew and flourished, is an evidence of
the inefficiency of the common law, which failed to satisfy the
public needs. This law, which has never ceased to grow and ex-
pand by the light of reason and sound morals, has triumphed over
the common law, for it has been enacted in conservative England,
and many of our states, that "where the rules of equity and the
common law conflict, the rules of equity shall prevail." '33  How-
ever, long before this legislation, enlightened jurists in the mother
country adopted a host of the equity rules in the courts of law,
and Lord Mansfield so expanded the law by the adoption of equity
principles and the customs of merchants, that he imbued it with
a freshness and vigor partaking of his own glowing and masculine
intellect.
We mention a few of the many cases in which the common law
gave no relief. No common-law writ, for example, existed by
which a defective instrument could be reformed, a fraudulent con-
veyance set aside, a mistake or accident effectually relieved against,
or a beneficial interest in property enforced against the holder of
the legal title. Nor did the common law give a remedy by which
a contract for the sale of real estate could be specifically enforced;
nor did it furnish any remedy for the prevention of a wrong, as
by injunction; and where the facts of the case lay wholly within
the knowledge of the plaintiff and defendant, there could be no
relief, because the common law forbade either of the parties -to
82DIGBY, HIST. REAL PROPERTY, 5 ed., 324.
w36 and 37 VICTORIA, ch. 66, §§24, 25; 10 R. C. L. 262; Bettman V. Harness,
42 W. Va. 439; BISPHxAm, PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY, 9 ed., §11; EATON, EQuITY 3;
1 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 40.
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any action to testify on the trial, and the rule was the same as to
any one having a legal interest in the suit. 4
X
Some of the many examples where the law and equity courts
differ in their treatment of the same subject-matter are the
following:
1. The legal rule was that a scaled instrument could be dis-
charged only by another instrument of as high a character, or else
by a surrender of it so that the creditor could make profert of
the instrument in an action at law. But equity regarded the seal
as a mere form, and the debt as a real fact, and its payment as a
satisfaction. It therefore relieved the debtor who had thus paid
by restraining the action at law brought on the instrument.
Equity disregarded the seal and looked into the real relations of
the parties and rejected the rule that a seal can be discharged
only by an act of equal degree. These equitable doctrines have
long since been transferred into the law of this country.
2. Again, by the old common law a creditor could not main-
tain an action upon a lost instrument, because he could not make
proftrt of it. If he lost the instrument he lost his debt by the
rules of law. But equity disregarded this form, and gave relief
by enforcing the demand. Later this equitable rule has been
adopted by the law courts, although in some states equity alone
can give relief.5 ,
3. Courts of equity took a different view of the rights of the
parties in respect to forfeitures and penalties. For example, a
bond for the payment of one hundred dollars is executed payable
in sixty days, with condition to pay three hundred dollars in
case the principal is not paid on the date specified. The ancient
common law rigidly exacted the penalty in such case, if the money
was not paid on the day it was due. But from the earliest times
341 GnENLnAr, EVIDENCE, 15 ed., §327-9; CAMBEnLAYNE'S BEST, EVxoENcEE 3
ed., 154; 1 STAR=mn, EVIDMENCE, 7 ed., 104.
"Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 151; see Campbell v. Myers, 72 W. Va. 428; Austin
V. Galloway, 72 W. Va. 221; Kabler v. Spencer, 114 Va. 589, 77 S. E. 504; MeLin
v. Richmond, 114 Va. 244; Lyttle -. Cozad, 21 V. Va. 183; Hall v. Wilkinson, 35
W. Va. 167, 12 S. E. 1118; Clark v. Nickell, 73 W. Va. 69, 79 S. E. 1020.
The word "Instrument" as here used means a sealed writing. As an unsealed
"note" did not require "profert" to be made thereof, if lost, proof of the contents
vas sufficient. 1 MADDOX, CH. PRAC. 25; Walmsley v. Child, 1 yes. Sr. 341, 345;
Glynn v. Bank of England, 2 yes. Sr. 38.
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COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY
equity adopted the policy of relieving against penalties and for-
feitures by treating the time of performance as immaterial, and a
substantial conformity to the stipulations in the bond as suffi-
cient. It gave-the creditor what was justly and equitably due
him, which usually consisted of the principal and interest, and
compelled him to forego the surplus or penalty which he had ex-
acted, and which the law permitted him to retain. Afterwards
the law courts gave judgment for the penalty, but to be discharged
by payment of the amount actually due; and sometimes not for
the penalty, but only for the amount actually due.
4. As to titles, courts of equity took a different view from
courts of law. By the common law all property was either real or
personal, tangible or intangible. Title to real estate of the tangi-
ble character could pass only by livery of seisin, which generally
meant an actual change of possession, and the law courts refused
to recognize any other title. Thuq, in a conveyance to A for the
use of B, courts of law utterly denied any claim of title in B
and refused to recognize that B had any right therein.3 6 B could
be sued at law for trespass in taking the rents and profits.37
Equity, however, recognized B as the beneficial owner and held A
to be a mere trustee for B and allowed him to reap the benefits of
the property by restraining A from prosecuting any action at
law against B. This recognized the principle of trusts, which in
its many phases equity has always fostered.
In respect to tangible personal property equity supported a
trust in respect thereto in like manner as in respect to real
estate. But there was intangible personality called choses in
action, which the common law held could not be transferred. Thus,
at common law things in action, expectancies, possibilities and the
like were not assignable.3 8 But equity always recognized the right
to transfer title to a chose, and protected the transferee for a
valuable consideration. Afterwards, the law courts adopted the
rules of equity in this respect, first, as to negotiable instruments,
and afterwards as to non-negotiable instruments, and other evi-
dences of debt.39
MBILLSON, EQuTy IN iTs RELATIONS TO COMMON LAw 167; DIGBY, HIST. LAW
REAL PROPERTY, 5 ed., '320.
3BILLSON, EQuITy n; IS RELATIONS TO COMMON LAw 169.
$8COxE LIT. 266a; 2 BL. Com. 290.
395ee Rowe v. Dawson, 1 yes. Sr. 331; Master v. Miller, 4 T. 1. 320, 340, 341-2,
1 Eq. Cas. Abridged 44.
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5. To say nothing of the vast difference in the mode of pro-
cedure between the two courts, of the fact that equity acted
directly upon the person, while the law courts acted against the
property of the defendant in most cases, there was an auxiliary
jurisdiction exercised by the chancellor as to "suits for discov-
ery" and "suits for perpetuation of testimony," or for taking
testimony de bene esse, and divers other instances in which courts
of equity proceeded differently than did the courts of law.
Every one knows that the federal government as well as many
of the states of this union observe the distinction between courts
of law and courts of equity, whether the law is administered by
the same judge or by different tribunals, and the rules and prac-
tices of each court are kept separate and distinct. Under the
"reformed procedure" or code practice, adopted by a great num-
ber of the states there has been a fusion of equity and law prin-
ciples and all are administered by the same tribunal.
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